THEY JUST TURNED OFF THE TAPS:
By Roy Giles | Fri 23 Jan 2009 at 20.23 GMT
Categories: Intelligence, International Relations | Tags: europe, gas, Russia
IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE OF THREE WEEKS WITHOUT RUSSIAN GAS.
Starting at the New Year, Russia stopped sending her gas to Europe via Ukraine. Not for the first time – similar tactics were used in 2006, and were also applied to Belarus. The facts of the case are reported widely. In each case the immediate results were real hardship in the economies and domestic conditions of the European countries most dependent on the supply from Russia, in particular those without ample stored reserves. So, when re-examining this episode – a genuine crisis – what are the significant implications? a) Was there yet another intelligence failure , and should Russia’s many customers have been more aware?b) What does the handling or mishandling tell us about Europe’s relations with Russia? c) A future pipeline cut-off could be implemented by means of “terrorist” action, after which restoring supplies would be a lengthy process. d) Finally, is Russia now, demonstrably, an unscrupulous and unreliable partner in a strategically vital sector of Europe’s economy?
Comments (7)
2009 Videoconference Report
I hope I can add an update to the short piece I put in yesterday, because in this morning’s newspaper there is the following item: “The impact very much resembles that of a terrorist attack”. So says Petar Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Energy Minister, on the effect of Russia temporarily cutting gas supplies to his country, quoted in “The Times” London, 24th Jan 09. Thus, in Russia’s current ruling hands (and I can see no separation or distinction between the Kremlin and Gazprom in the matter of “ruling”) those gas taps have the capability of being used as effectively as if they were a terrorist weapon. This 21st Century Russian strategic “weapon system” is demonstrably deployable. During the Cold War of recent but fading memory, the 20th Century Soviet army and air forces were the strategic weapon systems of that age – but they were demonstrably NOT deployable, except within the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact, because if used against the free countries of Europe their deployment would have triggered World War 3. So, contrast with today. An embittered Russian leadership, possibly even a vengeful leadership, faced with many internal and external problems, has a useable strategic weapon whose “reach” extends into the vital life-support systems of most of the countries of Europe. And this weapon is, handily, just “on tap”…….
This an interesting topic. I confess I haven’t followed it that closely, but I wonder whether such moves shall become an ‘annual event’ as contracts come up for renewal and each side jostle for reaping best terms for their side.
Some further thought into ‘mitigating contingencies’ will be valuable here!
A
Thank you Adam Svendsen – I recognised the handwriting! I was in Poland when this affair was in full spate, and was greatly impressed with the concerns expressed by Central European figures via the Polish media. I think that the EU will have to be much more sensitive to the feelings and priorities of “New Europe”, and not try to brush such problems away with… “it is just a commercial matter..” Russia and Ukraine undoubtedly have so many points on which they can find reasons to quarrel, but it must be in the wider European interests for us to busy ourselves with developing ‘mitigating contingencies’. These could take various forms – perhaps we can attract some ideas?
I’m a polish student, I live in Warsaw and I had a good view on this topic. Poland was also in danger to loose some of the gas from Russia. As Mr Giles wrote, this situation is taking place for a few years. Always starting at New Years Eve. I think that Russia is afraid of loosing its global position and try to show how powerfull it still is. The same case was with the Georgia, but this is maybe topic for another discussion.
Thank you Kate – I am sure that your perspectives from within Poland on the events of January were much sharper than ours in England. As for the reasoning behind Russia’a actions, there is an opinion that Russia’s intention was to “punish” Ukraine, but not to involve the wider EU in the matter except as a lever to push Ukraine into a compliant position. The EU seemed to me, initially, to be falling for this role, but in the end did appreciate what was at stake. The overall outcome for Russia appears now to be almost entirely negative, with many more EU countries worried about energy security. Public opinion is now concerned about the vulnerabilities of a pipeline system that to most of us, hitherto, was literally “out of sight and out of mind”.
I would be interested if someone could take up Adam Svendsen’s earlier question: what sensible actions should now follow, politically and industrially, on all sides?
Привет, Рой.
Если Украина не платит за газ,но забирает его себе ,что же делать бедному Газпрому, кроме как закрывать кран ?
Yevgenii poses a brief and direct question: “If Ukraine doesn’t pay for the gas, yet keeps it for her own use, what else is poor Gazprom to do except turn off the tap?”
This raises interesting issues, that can be drawn from features in both the 2006 and 2009 episodes. 1: What is the position of the parties to the dispute according to international commercial law? 2. On the strategic level, how did various countries and the EU react to the crisis and perform as it developed- did they act intelligently and wisely? 3. As for motivation, were the different countries seen to be guided purely by national self-interest, or did they act in sensible co-ordination, conscious of each others’ degrees of vulnerability? 3. At the tactical and technical level, what measures should be taken by all those affected in 2006 and 2009 to avoid any repetition.
Needless to say, I would hope that we might get some answers to the foregoing from correspondents with the necessary experience and background expertise. Thank you Yevgenii for being so succinct.