Is there a *rosy* future for ‘futures/blue skies thinking’ in overall strategic intelligence efforts?
By admin | Fri 8 May 2009 at 16.14 GMT
Categories: Intelligence
Calculating the ‘costs and benefits’ of undertaking ‘futures and blue skies thinking’ in overall strategic intelligence efforts is highly challenging. Here, perhaps we are talking more about the ‘qualitiative’ or ‘artistic’ domain of intelligence, rather than the ‘quantitative’ or ’scientific’ dimensions of intelligence?
However, undertaking such activity should not be discounted in overall strategic intelligence efforts; this is no matter how ‘intangible’ they might appear – especially on first, most immediate, impressions. Most significantly, further reflection on pressing topical issues, both in terms of their width and depth, is encouraged. A rosy future is therefore posited for ‘futures/blue skies thinking’ in overall strategic intelligence efforts.
Might there be further similar areas which could be further valuably exploited into the future?
Post by Adam Svendsen
Comments (4)
2009 Videoconference Report
Adam, I am not convinced that futures and blue sky thinking needs to be challenging. You imply its something separate; an add-on as if an effective intelligence operation can happen without it. Let me explain why I say that. The key to successful intelligence is to spend most of your effort discovering what your customer needs to know, whether that information can be accessed at all and if it can whether the product of further processing can be exploited in time, in context and adds value to your customer’s decision making and thus his intent. Blue Sky thinking and considering futures is all bound up in this initial process of Direction – the start of the intelligence cycle. Get that wrong and the rest of the activity in the cycle is largely wasted.
I agree with Chris, but feel that sometimes the focus on ‘the intelligence cycle’ can distract from the essentially collaborative nature of the command-intelligence partnership. I assume you are familiar with the work of Gregory F Treverton (eg, “Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information”). His clear explantion of the different roles of intelligence when in support of ‘considering possible futures’ (through analysis of competing hypotheses for command – what he calls mysteries) as opposed to analysis of the past / present (through more linear techniques for control – what he calls puzzles) is excellent. His analysis of these in relation to the Cold War as opposed to Afghanistan is also, IMHO, excellent.
Patrick, trust you to expand the debate and correctly place the intelligence function as one of several contributors to the command decision making piece. The cycle that matters is the planning – intelligence – execution/operations one – also continuous and also adding value at every stage for those responsible. My experience suggets to me at least, that to be effective intelligence is not a separate compartment but just part of a collaboration between principals. This brings us to people and the trust that exists between them. The collaboration works well where there is trust and respect; where there is not, its always hard work.
Moving to David Marsey’s observation I agree a mix of art and logic is essential to sound assessment. The art challenges the logic, asks the absurd questions and requires to be disabused of absurdity by logic. The flaw of course is that intelligence should only really interested in people and organisations; organisms that science has problems with. They are the ones with the agendas, the irational ideas and the unpredictable responses. The best way to deal with irrationality is to nudge it towards a more predictable and favourable outcome – that means cunning planning (informed by intelligence) and smart, agile operational execution (informed by intelligence)
I agree with Chris and Patrick that context is all important. My reading of intelligence shortfalls is that the analysis has often been okay, but in the wrong context.
I also agree with Adam that there can be a need to go beyond science as normally understood. Perhaps an analogy with the financial crisis would be helpful? The Turner review blamed in part the use of ’sophisticated maths’ and commended the insights of Keynes’ mathematical work ‘Treatise on Probability’. It seems to me that over-reliance on ‘normal/quantitative science’ helped create the crash, but that some ‘qualitative science’, which didn’t take the context for granted, would have been helpful.
I am unconvinced that an artistic approach is always adequate. I am not suggesting that strategic intelligencers need detailed training in the appropriate science, but it might be a good idea for their training to be consistent with best practice in reasoning under gross uncertainty.