Comments on: Is there a *rosy* future for ‘futures/blue skies thinking’ in overall strategic intelligence efforts? http://goa-intelligence.org/main/intelligence/2009/05/is-there-a-rosy-future-for-futuresblue-skies-thinking-in-overall-strategic-intelligence-efforts Connecting Students, Scholars, and Practitioners of Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, and International Relations Thu, 01 Apr 2010 21:34:34 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Chris Holtom http://goa-intelligence.org/main/intelligence/2009/05/is-there-a-rosy-future-for-futuresblue-skies-thinking-in-overall-strategic-intelligence-efforts/comment-page-1#comment-106 Chris Holtom Thu, 01 Apr 2010 21:34:34 +0000 http://goa-intelligence.org/main/?p=78#comment-106 Patrick, trust you to expand the debate and correctly place the intelligence function as one of several contributors to the command decision making piece. The cycle that matters is the planning - intelligence - execution/operations one - also continuous and also adding value at every stage for those responsible. My experience suggets to me at least, that to be effective intelligence is not a separate compartment but just part of a collaboration between principals. This brings us to people and the trust that exists between them. The collaboration works well where there is trust and respect; where there is not, its always hard work. Moving to David Marsey's observation I agree a mix of art and logic is essential to sound assessment. The art challenges the logic, asks the absurd questions and requires to be disabused of absurdity by logic. The flaw of course is that intelligence should only really interested in people and organisations; organisms that science has problems with. They are the ones with the agendas, the irational ideas and the unpredictable responses. The best way to deal with irrationality is to nudge it towards a more predictable and favourable outcome - that means cunning planning (informed by intelligence) and smart, agile operational execution (informed by intelligence) Patrick, trust you to expand the debate and correctly place the intelligence function as one of several contributors to the command decision making piece. The cycle that matters is the planning – intelligence – execution/operations one – also continuous and also adding value at every stage for those responsible. My experience suggets to me at least, that to be effective intelligence is not a separate compartment but just part of a collaboration between principals. This brings us to people and the trust that exists between them. The collaboration works well where there is trust and respect; where there is not, its always hard work.

Moving to David Marsey’s observation I agree a mix of art and logic is essential to sound assessment. The art challenges the logic, asks the absurd questions and requires to be disabused of absurdity by logic. The flaw of course is that intelligence should only really interested in people and organisations; organisms that science has problems with. They are the ones with the agendas, the irational ideas and the unpredictable responses. The best way to deal with irrationality is to nudge it towards a more predictable and favourable outcome – that means cunning planning (informed by intelligence) and smart, agile operational execution (informed by intelligence)

]]> By: Dave Marsay http://goa-intelligence.org/main/intelligence/2009/05/is-there-a-rosy-future-for-futuresblue-skies-thinking-in-overall-strategic-intelligence-efforts/comment-page-1#comment-97 Dave Marsay Thu, 04 Mar 2010 19:56:19 +0000 http://goa-intelligence.org/main/?p=78#comment-97 I agree with Chris and Patrick that context is all important. My reading of intelligence shortfalls is that the analysis has often been okay, but in the wrong context. I also agree with Adam that there can be a need to go beyond science as normally understood. Perhaps an analogy with the financial crisis would be helpful? The Turner review blamed in part the use of 'sophisticated maths' and commended the insights of Keynes' mathematical work 'Treatise on Probability'. It seems to me that over-reliance on 'normal/quantitative science' helped create the crash, but that some 'qualitative science', which didn't take the context for granted, would have been helpful. I am unconvinced that an artistic approach is always adequate. I am not suggesting that strategic intelligencers need detailed training in the appropriate science, but it might be a good idea for their training to be consistent with best practice in reasoning under gross uncertainty. I agree with Chris and Patrick that context is all important. My reading of intelligence shortfalls is that the analysis has often been okay, but in the wrong context.

I also agree with Adam that there can be a need to go beyond science as normally understood. Perhaps an analogy with the financial crisis would be helpful? The Turner review blamed in part the use of ’sophisticated maths’ and commended the insights of Keynes’ mathematical work ‘Treatise on Probability’. It seems to me that over-reliance on ‘normal/quantitative science’ helped create the crash, but that some ‘qualitative science’, which didn’t take the context for granted, would have been helpful.

I am unconvinced that an artistic approach is always adequate. I am not suggesting that strategic intelligencers need detailed training in the appropriate science, but it might be a good idea for their training to be consistent with best practice in reasoning under gross uncertainty.

]]> By: Patrick Beautement http://goa-intelligence.org/main/intelligence/2009/05/is-there-a-rosy-future-for-futuresblue-skies-thinking-in-overall-strategic-intelligence-efforts/comment-page-1#comment-96 Patrick Beautement Thu, 04 Mar 2010 16:04:23 +0000 http://goa-intelligence.org/main/?p=78#comment-96 I agree with Chris, but feel that sometimes the focus on 'the intelligence cycle' can distract from the essentially collaborative nature of the command-intelligence partnership. I assume you are familiar with the work of Gregory F Treverton (eg, "Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information"). His clear explantion of the different roles of intelligence when in support of 'considering possible futures' (through analysis of competing hypotheses for command - what he calls mysteries) as opposed to analysis of the past / present (through more linear techniques for control - what he calls puzzles) is excellent. His analysis of these in relation to the Cold War as opposed to Afghanistan is also, IMHO, excellent. I agree with Chris, but feel that sometimes the focus on ‘the intelligence cycle’ can distract from the essentially collaborative nature of the command-intelligence partnership. I assume you are familiar with the work of Gregory F Treverton (eg, “Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information”). His clear explantion of the different roles of intelligence when in support of ‘considering possible futures’ (through analysis of competing hypotheses for command – what he calls mysteries) as opposed to analysis of the past / present (through more linear techniques for control – what he calls puzzles) is excellent. His analysis of these in relation to the Cold War as opposed to Afghanistan is also, IMHO, excellent.

]]> By: Chris Holtom http://goa-intelligence.org/main/intelligence/2009/05/is-there-a-rosy-future-for-futuresblue-skies-thinking-in-overall-strategic-intelligence-efforts/comment-page-1#comment-93 Chris Holtom Sat, 24 Oct 2009 09:54:39 +0000 http://goa-intelligence.org/main/?p=78#comment-93 Adam, I am not convinced that futures and blue sky thinking needs to be challenging. You imply its something separate; an add-on as if an effective intelligence operation can happen without it. Let me explain why I say that. The key to successful intelligence is to spend most of your effort discovering what your customer needs to know, whether that information can be accessed at all and if it can whether the product of further processing can be exploited in time, in context and adds value to your customer's decision making and thus his intent. Blue Sky thinking and considering futures is all bound up in this initial process of Direction - the start of the intelligence cycle. Get that wrong and the rest of the activity in the cycle is largely wasted. Adam, I am not convinced that futures and blue sky thinking needs to be challenging. You imply its something separate; an add-on as if an effective intelligence operation can happen without it. Let me explain why I say that. The key to successful intelligence is to spend most of your effort discovering what your customer needs to know, whether that information can be accessed at all and if it can whether the product of further processing can be exploited in time, in context and adds value to your customer’s decision making and thus his intent. Blue Sky thinking and considering futures is all bound up in this initial process of Direction – the start of the intelligence cycle. Get that wrong and the rest of the activity in the cycle is largely wasted.

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